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Since 1947, the Vietnam Social Security has provided social insurance to public servants 
and armed forces personnel in Vietnam. In 1995, the Government merged the social 
insurance unit of the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs with that of the 
Vietnam General Confederation of Labor. At the same time the system  became 
mandatory to the employees of the newly developing private sector. The consolidated 
system is publicly managed by the Vietnamese Social Security administration (VSS) that 
collects contributions and pay social insurance benefits (in case of sickness and sick 
leaves, maternity and family planning related leaves, work injury and professional 




of the private sector was first restricted to the enterprises with 10 or more employees. 
Since 2005, all the types of enterprises, whatever their size, have the obligation to register 
to VSS the employees with a labor contract of 3 months or longer.  
In recent years, participation to VSS has been increasing fast along the development of 
the private sector. The number of contributors (public and private employees) of 3 231 
thousand persons in 1996 increased to 6 971 thousand persons in 2007. While private 
employees represented only 4% of the contributors in 1995, they represented 44% of the 
total contributors in 2007.  Still, the number of contributors if compared to the number of 
people reporting being employed in Vietnam is relatively small. It covers 38.8% of the 




. The reasons for this low coverage are unknown. It could be that these persons are 
not employed under a labor contract or that their employers are not well aware of their 
social obligations. It could be also that employers avoid register (with or without 
employees implicit agreement) to obtain higher enterprises revenues or to pay higher 
employee’s net wages.  
                    
1 Comments and questions are welcomed at paulettecastel@gmail.com 
2 Since 2006, self-employed and farmers can participate in a voluntary publicly managed pension fund. 
Participation to health insurance is also possible since 2005. 
















































































































dDetermining the reasons that explain in Vietnam the low coverage of social security has 
direct policy implications. If employees are not aware of their legal rights or employers 
simply do not respect the law, law enforcements and public campaign should have a 
positive impact on coverage. However, if through avoidance, employees obtain higher net 
wages, these policies could fail. Employees as well as employers could resist the changes.  
 
This paper investigates these issues. It uses the information of the Census of enterprises 
of 2006. This database includes 129 566 enterprises from the public (2.6%), the private 
sector (94.2%) and the foreign invested sector (3.2%). It is expected to cover, therefore, 
most of the employees that should be according to the law registered to the Vietnam 
Social Security with the exception of the employees of the public administration and 
some minor groups such as the student enrolled in overseas institutions. However, 
because the private sector in Vietnam includes many households units which inventory is 
difficult to make, the Census of enterprises of 2006 is likely not exhaustive of all the 
small enterprises in Vietnam. According to the Census of enterprises the total number of 
employees in state owned and private enterprises in Vietnam in 2005 was equal to 
6,038,456. That number in the household survey of 2006 was equal to 17,460,658
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.   
The study starts with a classification of the enterprises depending on their participation to 
the Vietnam Social Security. Among the enterprises that contribute, one striking feature 
is that on average the share in the wage bill of the contributions paid to the Vietnam 
Social Security is much lower than the contribution rate established in the law. Even if 
the enterprises that do not register their employees are excluded from the calculation, the 
average ratio is of 7.6% while the legal rate was in 2006 equal to 23%. The study, 
consequently, examine this issue before investigating the characteristics of the enterprises 
that do not register their employees. The paper shows that this low ratio is due to a wide 
practice by enterprises of paying contributions on lower wages than current wages. The 
paper investigates, furthermore, who benefit from the practice of avoiding registration 
and from the practice of under-reporting wages to social security. The results indicate 
strong evidence that employees in enterprises that are not registered to social security and 
in enterprises  that under report wage receive higher net wages. Evidences about 
enterprises’ higher revenues per worker are not strong. The last section discusses the 
implications of these findings regarding future trends in coverage and social security 
policies toward low income. They argue that the wide spread practice of under reporting 
wages to social security  will increasingly erode public appreciation of the insurance role 
of social security in reducing income shocks. This, in turn, will reassure employers and 
employees about the appropriateness of their behavior regarding evasion and/or under 
reporting wages. This section also argues that the practice of under reporting wages leads 
that the system guarantees the minimum pension to many retirees that are not low income 
earners. This policy leakage is unfair and costly. Both consequences raise concerns about 




                    
4 See companion paper 1.  Registering employees to the Vietnam Social Security  
 
Table 1 reports the participation rate of enterprises and employees to the Vietnam Social 
Security that is the percentage of firms that contribute to the Vietnam Social Security in 
the total number of firms. The results show that among the 129 566 surveyed enterprises 
only 59 346 firms (45.8%) contributed to the Vietnam Social Security. As expected the 
rate of participation of the state owned enterprise is very high (95.4%) with average size 
of 496 employees. Since it is rather difficult to believe that in Vietnam some public 
owned enterprises could not comply with the law, the 4.6% of non participation is likely 
due to reporting errors.  
 
By contrast the participation rate of the enterprises of the enterprise of the private sector 
is low (83.1% in the case of the FDI enterprises with average size of 362 workers and 
43.2% for the others with average size of 38 employees). Only the enterprises with some 
public capital show a high participation rate (92.8%).  
 
Table 1 
Enterprises Participation Rates to the Vietnam Social Security  









Total  129566  59346  45.8 
Public  3378  3222  95.4 
    Central State Enterprises   934  920  98.5 
    Local State Enterprises  1309  1289  98.5 
    Joint Stock with Public Capital (>50%)  1135  1013  89.3 
Private  122025  52667  43.2 
     Collective  6220  2771  44.5 
     Private  36805  9840  26.7 
     Collective name  32  15  46.9 
     Private Limited Companies  62847  31173  49.6 
     Joint Stock with Public Capital  1320  1225  92.8 
     Joint Stock no Public Capital  14801  7643  51.6 
Foreign Investment  4162  3457  83.1 
      100% foreign  3289  2727  82.9 
      Joint venture  873  730  83.6 
Sources:
 
 Author’s calculation based on the Census  
2.  Share of  Vietnam Social Security contributions in total wages  
 
Among the enterprises that contribute, one striking feature is that on average the share of 
the contributions paid by enterprises to the Vietnam Social Security in the wage bill (the 
sum wages payments) is much lower than the contribution rate established in the law.  As 
it is shown in Box 1, this ratio should be according to the law equal to 23%. The figures 
in Table 3 indicate that it is in reality far below and equal in average to 7.6%.  
  
 
Surprisingly, the share of contributions in total wages is abnormally low in the public 
sector (7.6%) as well as in the private sector (9.5 % in the case of enterprises with FDI 
and 5.9% in the others).  Part of the explanation is likely that some enterprises transferred 
to the Vietnam Social Security only a portion of the contributions due because of 
financial difficulties or occasionally in order to avoid a delay in the payment of the social 
Box 1: Vietnam Social Security Contribution Rates 
 
Social contributions are paid to three funds: the pension and survivorship fund, 
the social security fund that regroups the sickness, maternity, family planning, 
work injury and professional disease benefits and the health insurance fund. The 
structure of the contribution rates applied in 2005 on the wages reported in the 
Enterprise Census is described in Table 2.  
 
Table 2  
Contributions rates  
Type of benefits
b  Employers   Employees  Total 
Old age and survivorship   10  5
a  15 
Sickness, maternity and family 
planning leaves
c  4
d    4 
Work injury and professional disease
c    1    1 
Health insurance
 e   2  1  3
 f 
Total  17  6  23 
Note: (a) Increased to 6% in 2007; starting 2010 to be increased by 2 p.p. every 2 
years until it reaches 12% starting this rate is increased by 1% every year until it 
reaches 8% (b) the Social Security Law of 2006 foresees the introduction of 
unemployment benefit in the future (c) Contribution rates merged in only one 
category before the Social Security Law of 2006 (d) Reduced to 3% in the Social 
Security Law of 2006 of which 2 p.p. is kept in the enterprise in reserves (e) the 
functioning of health insurance is described in a specific law; (f) under the Health 
insurance law of 2008, possibly increased up to 6% depending on the financing 
needs. 
 
These rates are defined on net wages that is on the amount employees take home 
after the social contributions are deduced.  
 
Although the law distinguishes the portion paid by the employees from the 
portion paid by the employers, employers are responsible for the overall 
payment of the contributions due. Accordingly, the amount of contributions 
reported in the Enterprise Census should be equal to 23% of the total amount of 
wages paid by the enterprises.  
 
Starting 2007, the contribution rate has been increased to 24% but enterprises are 
authorized to keep part of the contributions (2 p.p.) in reserves to be able to pay 
employee’s social security short-term benefits in case of sickness, maternity an 
family planning related leaves. The share of the contributions in total wages will, 
consequently, be reduced to 22%.  
 security benefits to the employees that are in sick or maternity leave
5
 
. These events, by 
themselves, cannot explain, however, that a majority of enterprises contribute very low 
shares of the wages to the Vietnam Social Security as Figures 1 and 2 show below. 
Table 3 
Share of Contributions in Total Wages  
Average by ownership  
   Amount of 
Contributions 











Total  8943  118412  7.6 
Public  3631  48057  7.6 
    Central State Enterprises   1950  29435  6.6 
    Local State Enterprises  817  8391  9.7 
    Joint Stock with Public Capital 
(>50%)  863  10770  8.0 
Private  2254  38247  5.9 
     Collective  41  920  4.5 
     Private  104  2559  4.1 
     Collective name  0.5  8  6.3 
     Private Limited Companies  891  18579  4.8 
     Joint Stock with Public Capital 
(<50%)  644  7779  8.3 
     Joint Stock no Public Capital  573  8380  6.8 
Foreign Investment  3058  32108  9.5 
      100% foreign  2374  24349  9.7 
      Joint venture  658  7757  8.5 
Sources: Author’s calculation based on the Census  
Notes
  
: (a )in some enterprises, the study assumes that all employees are not registered to the Vietnam 
Social Security.  More details are provided in annex 1.  
Figure 1 shows more than half of the enterprises (66.93%) contribute as less as an amount 
lower than 5% of the wages they pay. Only a very few number (3.47 %) of the enterprises 








                    
5 As it is mentioned in Box 2, the law of 2006 foresees the retention of part of the contributions by the 
enterprise. We do not know, however, if a similar practice was authorized before. In any case, it would 
explain a much lower reduction of the observed share of the contributions in wages that the one that is 
effectively observed.  Figure 1: Observed share of contributions in total wages:  









































Figure 2 shows the numbers of employees that are affected by such a behavior. The 
results are as well alarming: about 3.2 millions persons are employed in enterprises in 
which the share of the contributions represents less than 10% of the wages.  
 
Figure 2: Observed share of contributions in total wages:  











































 This situation means that enterprises either do not register all their employees to the 
Vietnam Social Security or do not report all the wages they effectively pay their 
employees (or both).   Both situations are possible in Vietnam. First, short-term 
employees  with labor contracts shorter than for 3 months  are not registered to the 
Vietnam Social Security. Second, contributions are not calculated on the total amount of 
wage costs that enterprises report to the Tax authorities but on the wages that are reported 
in employees’ labor books that is on the wages that were determined at the time the labor 
contracts were signed.  These amounts are usually not revised when employees’ wages 
are increased. As a result, the relative size of the wage reported in the labor book 
diminishes overtime in relation to the current wages effectively received by employees. 
Hence, the share of the contributions paid to the Vietnam Social Security in current 
wages tends also to decline overtime until the level of the wage reported in the labor book 
hits the level of the legal minimum wage. Figures 3 and 4 give an illustration of that 
process.  
Figure 3: Illustration of the falling share of  
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Figure 4: Illustration of the falling share of  
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 Figure 3 shows the increasing gap between the current wage and the wage reported in the 
labor book as one moves away from the date the labor contract was signed. The wage in 
the labor contract is not revised until its level reaches the level of the legal minimum 
wage that is the bottom wage on which contributions can be paid (in year 8 in Figure 3). 
As a result in Figure 4, the share of the contributions in current wages steadily falls from 
23% in year 1 (when the labor contract is signed) to 10% in year 11. The fall is slowed 
after the wage in the labor book reached the level of the minimum wage and increases 
afterward at the same speed 
 
The following section evaluates the importance of these two factors.  
 
3.  Register of employees and report of wages to the Vietnam Social Security  
 
Two approaches help estimate the relative share of short-term employed not registered to 
the Vietnam Social Security. The first is based on the obligation to contribute at least 
23% of the minimum wage per worker. The second compares the number of employees 
working in the enterprises of the Enterprise Census to the number of employees officially 
registered to the Vietnam Social Security. The combine results indicate that short-term 
employees represent roughly 18.2% (882,351  persons)  of the enterprises total 
employment (the total does not include the employees of the enterprises that did not 
contribute at all to the Vietnam Social Security).  
 
Legally, the minimum level of contribution per worker must be equal to 23% of the 
minimum wage over the year. Some enterprises in the Enterprise Census report lower 
levels. One possibility is that these enterprises hire part-time workers, but in Vietnam 
such a practice is rare. Another possibility is that part of the employees were hired or 
fired during the year. Since only the employees with some long commitments with 
enterprises are likely to be registered to the Vietnam Social Security, the study assumes 
that these workers who have been hired or fired during the year are not registered. 
Accordingly, the number of the employees these enterprises report to the Vietnam Social 
Security is the number so that the average contribution per employee is equal to 23% of 
the minimum wage in the year.  
 
Let’s assume that N is the total number of employees reported by the enterprises, B the 
total amount of wage and C the level of contributions. If w is the minimum wage, the 
average contribution per worker should be higher or equal to 23% of the minimum wage 
(equation 1). If this condition is not verified, then the number of employees registered to 
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 Based on the information presented in Table 4, it appears that 65.9% enterprises (mostly 
from the private enterprises with 72%) do not verify (1).  
 
Table 4 
Level of the minimum wage in Vietnam in 2005 in thousand VND 
Period  Domestic  FDI region 1  FDI region 2  FDI region 3 
65.9Jan-Sept  290  626  556  487 
Oct-Dec  350  626  556  487 
         
Yearly average  305  626  556  487 
Note: 
Region 1 includes FDI enterprises in the urban districts of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City. Region 2 includes FDI enterprises in the suburban districts of Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City and the urban districts of Haiphong, Halong (Quang Ninh province), Bien 
Hoa(Dong Nai province), Long Khanh, Nhon Trach, Long Thanh, Vinh Cuu and Trang 
Bom (Dong Nai province) Thu Dau Mot, Thuan An, Di An, Ben Cat and Tan Uyen 
(Binh Duong) Vung Tau (Ba Ria - Vung Tau province). Region 3: includes all the other 
areas 
 
In these enterprises, the average contribution per worker is lower than 23% of the average 
wage in a year. Accordingly, the number of employees registered by these enterprises to 
the Vietnam Social Security was adjusted so that the reported amount of contribution per 
registered worker is equal to 23 % of the minimum wage in the year. 
 
As the figures in Table 5 indicate, the correction reduce the number of employees likely 
registered to the Vietnam Social Security from 4 852 942 to 3 970 591. According to this 




Estimate of employees under short-term contract (1)   
1. Total number of employees 
      Enterprise sector   4852942 
          + State sector  1598796 
          + Private sector  2001894 
          + FDI   1252252 
2. Total number of  employees likely registered   
      Enterprise sector   3970591 
          + State sector  1451039 
          + Private sector  1416344 
          + FDI   1103208 
3. Total number of  employees likely hired under short-term contracts 
      Enterprise sector   882351 
          + State sector  147757 
          + Private sector  585550 
          + FDI   149044  
 
The second approach compares the number of workers likely registered to the Vietnam 
Social Security obtained in Table 5 to the official number of contributors. The Vietnam 
Social Security provides figures of employees’ registration by ownership. However, it 
does not distinguish, in the public sector, the employees in the enterprise sector from the 
employees in the administration
6. So, in Table 6, the number of the employees in the 
administration is obtained from Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. It corresponds to 
the total of number of persons employed in the sectors of education, training and health, 
health and social work, activities of the Party and membership organization. Since the 
figures of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs do not differentiate employment by 
sector and ownership, the figure reported in Table 4 over-estimates the number of the 
public employees in the administration
7
 
.  Based on this estimate, the number of 
employees working in the sector enterprise and registered to the Vietnam Social Security 
is estimated to be equal to 3 742 119. An additional number of 228 472 persons would be 
short-term employed.  
 
. 
Sources: (a) Enterprise Census (b) Vietnam Social Security (c) Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs.  
 
If we combined the two approaches, about 1 110 823 employees (= 882351+228472) or 
22.9% of the employees the enterprises of the formal sector are not registered to the 
Vietnam Social Security, more likely because they are hired on short-term contracts.  
 
Based on the estimate of the number of employees hired under short-term contracts and 
therefore not registered to the Vietnam Social Security it is possible to estimate the 
                    
6 As a result, there is a difference in sum of contributions from the Census (8,943 billion VND) and sum of 
contribution from VSS data (14,483 billion VND).  
 
7 Because these sectors are largely dominated by the public sector, the error is expected to be relatively 
small.    
Table 6 
Estimate of employees under short-term contract (2)   
1.  Total number of  employees likely registered 
a  3970591 
1.1. Private sector  1416344 
1.2. FDI   1103208 
1.3. State sector  1451039 
2. Total number of employees officially registered 
b  6226991 
2.1 Central Government, Army, Finance, Education etc.
c   2484872 
2.2 Enterprise sector = (2) - (2.1.)  3742119 
2.2.1. Private sector   1374261 
2.2.2. FDI   1124566 
2.2.3. State sector = (2.2) - (2.2.1) - (2.2.2.)  1291915 
3. Additional number of  employees likely hired under short-term contracts 
3.1 Enterprise sector  228472 relative size of the gap between the reported and the current wages. The results are 
presented in Table 7 in which the numbers of employees registered by ownership 
correspond to the number reported in the second section of Table 6. Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to take into account that the average wage of these workers is possibly lower 
than the wages of the registered workers. They indicate that on average reported wages 
represent less than half of the current wages (42.6%). By ownership, the gap is the largest 


































Figure 3 and 4 show that about 42% of the enterprises, covering about 40% of overall 
workers, reported only 20-40% employee wages to VSS. In addition, roughly 33% of 
total firms, covering about 16% of the labor force in the enterprise sector, have the wage 
under-reporting level even less than 20%. Meanwhile, only 7% enterprises with 10% 
overall workers reported more than 80% employees’ wages to VSS.  
Table 7 
Estimate of the gap between reported and current wages    
1. Total reported contributions  (billion VND)   
      Enterprise sector  8943 
          + State sector  3631 
          + Private sector  2254 
          + FDI   3058 
2. Estimated number of employees registered to 
Vietnam Social Security  
 
      Enterprise sector  3742119 
          + State sector  1291915 
          + Private sector  1374261 
          + FDI   1124566 
3. Average reported wage  (thousand VND)   
      Enterprise sector   866 
          + State sector  1018 
          + Private sector  594 
          + FDI   985 
4. Average current wage 
 (thousand VND)   
      Enterprise sector   2033 
          + State sector  2505 
          + Private sector  1592 
          + FDI   2137 
5 Share of the reported wage in current wage (%)   
      Enterprise sector  42.6 
          + State sector  40.6 
          + Private sector  37.3 
          + FDI   46.1  
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Figure 6: Percentage of total employees by observed share of reported wages on 
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 4.  Enterprises and employees revealed preferences  
 
The analysis in the previous section indicate that of the xxx enterprises that are surveyed 
in the Enterprises Census, x% do not register their employees to the Vietnam Social 
Security, and x% do register them but report wages much lower than the current wages 
they pay. These behaviors clearly undermine the main objective of social insurance 
programs that is to reduce the income shock due to the incapacity to work. If employees 
are not covered, employees are not insured. But, even, when insured, the levels of the 
Vietnam Social Security benefits are insignificant in relation to the income shock the 
employees could face. X% of the employees are not covered, and x% of the employees 
insured income levels that represent less than half of their current wage.  
 
This lack of coverage does not seem consistent with the idea that social insurance is 
beneficial to employees. At a first glance, the causes look institutional: the lack of 
coverage is due to the size of the labor force employed under short-term contract and, the 
miss-interpretation by the enterprises and the Vietnam Social Security officers that 
contributions are only paid on the wages reported in the labor book. These factors 
certainly play a part, but  they are satisfactory to explain that if social insurance is 
beneficial, the lack of coverage is so widespread. A second group of explanations point 
out that workers are not aware of their social rights and enterprises take advantage of 
these circumstances to avoid paying social taxes and increase enterprise’s revenues. 
Public information campaign and measures strengthening law enforcement in that case 
would help increase coverage.  The impact of these policies could be, however, quite 
deceiving if the causes are related to enterprises and employees’ economic behaviors. By 
avoiding the payment or reducing the amount of contributions, enterprises can increase 
their revenues but employees also can take higher net wages home.  
 
Let’s assume that an enterprise hire a worker at the period t. The employees’ net wage 
reported in the labor book is 100 and at the period t the enterprise contributes 23 to the 
Vietnam Social Security.  The overall labor cost (or the gross wage) is 123. The employer 
possibly receives some capital income (from the capital invested in the enterprise and, 
some labor income (for the managerial activities)   
 
Let’s assume that in period t+1 the enterprise’s labor productivity increased by 20%. 
Under such a circumstance, all the labor income in the enterprise can increase by the 
same amount. Several scenarios are possible. They are described in Table 8:  
 
Because the enterprise labor productivity increased by 20%, the enterprise is able to bear 
an increase of its labor cost by 20% from 123 to 147.6. If contributions were paid on 
current wages (like in the first scenario) the enterprises would increase both the net wage 
and the amount of contributions by 20%. In practice, the level of the contributions 
remains unchanged. The surplus (4.6= 27.6-23.0) is possibly captured by the enterprise 
(scenario 2), paid to the employees through higher net wages (scenario 3) or shared 
(scenario 4).  
 
 Table 8 
Scenario 
Labor cost  








0. Initial period   123  23  100.0  0 
1. No evasion  147.6  27.6  120.0  0 
2. Employer’s capture   147.6  23  120.0  4.6 
3. Employee’s higher net wage  147.6  23  124.6  0 
4. Sharing  147.6  23  122.3  2.3 
 
 
The scenarios 2 and 4 are, in theory, possible only in the short and the medium terms. 
Under perfect competition and labor market mobility, employees will move to the 
enterprises that provide them the highest net wages, like in the scenario 2. As L. 
Summers (1989) explains, employees will not be willing to work in enterprises that pay 
contribution if the Social Security mandated benefits are worthless to them. In the 
example, above, employees will move to the enterprises that pay contributions on current 
wages (scenario 1) only if employees valuation of the Vietnam Social Security additional 
benefits worth the amount of additional contributions the enterprise will deduce from 
their net wage (in the example 4.6).  
 
If the scenario 3 is more likely than the scenario 2 or 4, public information campaign will 
have little impact on coverage and any law enforcement policy risks to be very unpopular 
among employees.  
 
The econometric analysis presented below search to understand from the pattern of the 
participation,  reporting wage and the revenues of the enterprise how much the low 
coverage observed in Vietnam is due to institutional factors, lack of knowledge or low 
valuation of the benefits from social insurance.  
 
The model reposes on the hypothesis that if all the enterprises registered their employees 
to the Vietnam Social Security and paid contributions on current wages the variances of 
the average wage per enterprise and the variance of the average enterprise’s revenue 
would not be as large as it is effectively observed. So, the relative levels of net wages and 
enterprise revenue per employees in a same branch (or industry) reflect the behavior of 
the employees and the enterprises toward the Vietnam Social Security. Under perfect 
competition, enterprises in a same branch face about the same labor unit costs. All the 
employees do not necessarily take home, however, the same net wage. Enterprises that do 
not register their employees to social security pay can pay the highest  net wages. 
Enterprises that do register their employees but don’t pay contribution on current wages, 
pay lower net wages than the enterprises that totally avoid registration but they can pay 
higher wages than the enterprises that contribute on current wages.  
 
As time passes and the reported and the current wages diverge, employees that work in 
the enterprises that do not contribute on current wages should be able to take home relatively higher wages than the workers who are employed in enterprises recently 
established. The model expects therefore a negative relationship between the relative 
wages of the enterprise i in the branch j and the ratio reported wages on current wages of 
that enterprise. 
 
The second situation is that enterprises’ avoidance benefits enterprises instead of the 
workers. If workers are not aware of their social rights or desire participate to social 
security but are in some way excluded from the sector of the enterprises that pay 
contribution on current wages, the association in (1) is not observed. These employees 
are paid net wages as low as in the formal sector and enterprises capture the unpaid 
contributions. In that context, enterprises that do not register employees or do not pay 
contributions on current wages are expected to report higher revenues per worker than the 
other enterprises of the same branch. The model expects therefore a negative relationship 
between the relative size of enterprises’ revenues per worker per branch and the ratio 
reported wages on current wages of that enterprise. 
 
Other enterprises’ characteristics,  X,i,n, such as the share of women employees, the 
location, the size of the enterprise and the type of ownership probably affect employees 
and enterprises behavior in relation to social security. They are included in the estimation.  
 
The study, accordingly, estimate the two following relationships:  
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where Wssi / Wi is the ratio between the reported and the current average wages of the 
enterprise i  and, (R/E) i is the level of the average revenues per worker of the enterprise i 
of the branch j. The coefficients c1  and  c2  are expected to be negative if avoiding 
employees and enterprises obtain higher net wages and higher revenues per worker than 
the other enterprises in the same branch, respectively.  The estimation, accordingly, is 
done using random fixed-effects. The results are presented in Table 9. 
 
The study uses also a multinomial logistic regression to verify if enterprises that evade 
social security registration report higher net wages or revenues per workers that  the 
enterprise that do register but do not pay contributions on current wages and that these 
enterprises report higher net wages or revenues per workers that the enterprise that do pay 
contributions on current wages.  
 
The model, therefore, classifies the enterprises in 3 groups. The first group, G1, includes 
the enterprises that do not register their employees. The second group, G2, includes the 
enterprises that do register their employees but do not pay contributions on current wages. 
The third group, G3, includes the enterprises that do register their employees and contribute on current wages
8
 
. The model expects within a branch that the relative size of 
the net wages and the revenues per worker is higher in the group 1 in relation to the group 
2 and higher in the group 2 in relation to the group 3.  
The results are presented in Table 10. In this table, the groups 2 and 3 have been divided 
in two groups, 4 and 5 that include the enterprises that appear to report only a portion of 
their employees and most likely pay contributions on the minimum wage. The group 2 
includes the enterprises in which the current average wage is higher than the minimum 
wage. The group 3 includes the enterprises in which the current average wage is lower 
than the minimum wage.  
 
Table 9 
Relation average wage and average revenue per worker and the ratio of the 
average reported wages to average current wages 
Random fixed effect model by branch 
dependent variable (log)  Average wage  Average revenue per worker 
  coefficient  95% conf. interv.  coefficient  95% conf. interv. 
Ratio average reported 
wages to average current 
wage   -0.38  -0.39  -0.36  0.82  0.80  0.85 
In private sector  -0.25  -0.27  -0.23  -0.27  -0.31  -0.23 
In FDI sector  0.36  0.34  0.39  -0.38  -0.43  -0.33 
Share of women  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03 
Number of employees 
(log)  0.06  0.06  0.07  -0.16  -0.17  -0.15 
Share of taxes in revenue  0.05  0.04  0.05  -0.22  -0.22  -0.21 
In region 2   -0.10  -0.12  -0.09  -0.07  -0.10  -0.05 
In region 3  -0.33  -0.34  -0.33  0.00  -0.01  0.02 
Constant   13.23  13.20  13.27  -8.57  -8.74  -8.41 
Revenue per worker 
(log)  0.24  0.24  0.25       
Average wage (log)        0.94  0.93  0.95 
sigma_u  0.239      0.868     
sigma_e  0.477      0.934     
rho  0.201      0.463     
Number of observation  120571      120571     
Number of groups  604      604     
Average number of 
observation per group  199.6      199.6     
R-squared within  0.3410      0.3141     
                  between   0.4213      0.2791     
                  overall  0.2856      0.2793     
Note
 
: all coefficients significant at 1% except the coefficients associated to the share of taxes in revenues 
 
                    
8 This group includes the most recent enterprises for which current wages are still equal to the reported 
wage but not by choice.   Table 10 
Social security participation profile and relative wage and revenues per 
worker per branch  
Multinominal logistic regression 
  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group 5 
Ratio average current wage to 
branch’s average current wages  0.55  -1.19  0.01  -7.48 
In private sector  -4.55  -5.50  -1.65  -3.76 
In FDI sector  -1.88  -3.23  -0.47  0.04* 
Ratio average revenues per 
worker to branch’s average 
revenues per worker  0.09  0.09  0.03  0.06 
Share of women  0.57  0.81  -0.03  -2.96 
Ratio number of employees to 
branch’s average number of 
employees   0.18  0.18  0.12  0.18 
Share taxes in revenues  -0.02**  0.02***  -0.38  -0.51* 
In region 2  -0.61  -0.55  -0.83  0.01*** 
In region 3  -1.29  -0.15*  -1.54  0.43 
Constant  2.66  1.47  1.77  3.44 
Group 1 is the base outcome  
Group 1 enterprises don’t register employees to social security 
Group 2 enterprises do not pay contributions on current wages 
Group 3 enterprises pay contributions on current wages 
Group 4 enterprises do not register all employees,  do not pay contributions on 
current wages, and likely pay contributions on minimum wage 
Group 5 enterprises do not register all employees, do likely pay current wages 
equal to minimum wage and so, pay contributions on current wages.  
Number of observations  123629       
Pseudo R2  0.1467       
Note
 
: all the  coefficients are significant at 1% except (*) significant at 5% (**) at 10% (***) not 
significant.  
The results in Table 9 show within branches a negative association between enterprises 
average wage and the ratio of the average reported wage to the average current wage. 
Workers that work in evading enterprises receive higher net wages. At the opposite, the 
results show a positive association between enterprises’ revenues per worker and the ratio 
of the average reported wage to the average current wage. Evading enterprises do not 
seem to capture the unpaid contributions  to  realize extra revenues. However, the 
conclusion is not strong because the results show also in both estimations a positive 
relationship between the relative wage and the enterprise level of revenues per worker.  
 
The coefficients reported in Table 10 indicate indicate that employees with the highest 
net wages are more likely working in enterprises that do not pay contributions on current 
wages (group 2). If enterprises that do not register employees to VSS did not capture any of the contributions to realize additional revenues, highest net wages should be associated 
to the group 1 (in that case, the coefficient associated to the net wages in group 2 would 
be negative and higher than in group 3). That the employees with the highest net wages 
are not those working in the group 1 suggests, therefore, that employees working in 
enterprises that are not registered to social security are possibly in a weak position in 
relation to their employers. Not only they do not have their social rights respected but 
they receive relatively low wages. As expected, employees with the lowest net wages are 
more likely working in enterprises of the group 3 (that pay contributions on current 
wages). The coefficient  associated to the workers of the group 5 is particularly low 
because they work in enterprises in which the average wage is under the minimum wage.   
 
The results regarding if  enterprises benefit from under-reporting are less clear. The 
coefficient associated to revenues per worker of the enterprises in group 2 and 3 is higher 
than the coefficients of the enterprises in group 1 (the base outcome group supposedly 
with coefficients equal to 0) and, there is no difference between the coefficients of 
group2 and group 3.  If employees in group 1 receive relatively low wages, enterprises in 
group 1 do not realize higher revenues per worker. This suggests that these enterprises 
are maybe less efficient than the other enterprises of the same branch.   
 
The coefficients associated to the other variables, indicate that working in the private 
sector (FDI or not) decreases the probability of registration to social security and, if 
registered, the likelihood that contributions are paid on current wages. At the opposite, 
being employed in enterprises with higher share of women increase the likelihood of 
being registered and having contributions paid on current wages. The size of the firm 
does increase the likelihood of being registered. Finally, enterprise’s tax burden measured 
by the ratio of the total taxed in the revenues does not seem to have any impact.  
 
  
5.  Social Implications 
 
Enterprises and employees weak inclination to contribute on current wages has important 
social implications. First, it contributes to the public appreciation that social security is 
not able to provide “meaningful’ benefits. Second, it provokes leakages in the policy that 
social security implements towards low income earners.   
 
Enterprises and employees weak inclination to contribute on current wages enhance 
public appreciation that social security is not able to provide “meaningful’ benefits. For 
example, according to the Social Security Law, sick leave benefits are equal to 75% of 
the wage earned in the previous month. This regulation aims at avoiding a large drop of 
income because of sickness. The impact in the reality is much different. If the reported 
wages represent only 42.6% (as it appears on average in Table 7), social security benefits 
replace only 37.1% of the sick worker’s current wage. This problem affects all the social 
insurance benefits. Old-age pensions, as a result, in many cases replace very little part of 
the pre-retirement income. That many pensions are very low will become evident when, around 2015
9
 
, the first workers who will have had contributed only from the private 
sector during 20 years will start retiring with pensions as low as 20.3% of their average 
income (= 55% of 36.9%).    
Not only the worker suffers a large income shock during their sick leave or at retirement 
but friends and relatives judge that social benefits are useless. This frustration confirms 
workers in their opinion that the value of social benefits is low and do not deserve paying 
higher amount of contributions. As Perry observes high informality is associated with a 
blunt societal indictment of the quality of the state’s service provision.  
 
Enterprises and employees weak inclination to contribute on current wages creates 
leakages in the policy that social security implements towards low income earners. 
According to the Social Security Law, all employees (registered in the mandatory scheme) 
are entitled to a minimum pension equal to the minimum wage if they have contributed 
for at least 20 years.  
 
A worker’s pension benefit is, therefore, the maximum between the result of the pension 
formula and the minimum pension.  
 
(5)  ) , ( MinP rW Max P k k =  
 
where Pk is the pension paid to the worker k, W the average of the reported wage used in 
the calculation, r the percentage of that income replaced by the pension benefit and MinP 
the minimum pension  
 
The result of the equation (x) is determined is equal to the minimum pension when: 
(6)   MinP rWk <  
 
Given that the minimum pension is equal to the minimum wage, the worker k will receive 
the minimum pension if:  
 





For example, workers with 20 years of contribution are entitled to a pension equal to 55% 
of their reported wages (r = 0.55). All workers that have a reported wage under 1.82 (= 
1/0.55) times the minimum wage will be entitled to the minimum pension benefit equal to 
the minimum wage. Workers entitled to the maximum replacement rate of 75% obtain a 
pension equal to the minimum wage when their average reported wage is under 1.3 
(=1/.75) times the minimum wage.  
   
Social security subsidies low income earner under the assumption that they do not have 
enough savings to complement pension income during retirement. This gap between 
                    
9 Workers who started contributing in 1995 will have contributed for 20 years in 2015. All the workers 
that have only contributed to the private sector and retire before that year are not entitled to monthly 
pension benefit.  reported and current wages creates important leakages in that policy. Many workers 
entitled to the minimum pensions are not low income earners. Their average current wage 
is higher than 1/r of the minimum wage.  
 
This leakage is potentially very important. It is symptomatic that in the database of the 
Enterprise Census 3.1 percent of the enterprises report average current wages under the 
threshold of 1.3 of the minimum wage but they all do report average wages below.  
 
Table 11 
Enterprise with average wage lower than 1.3 minimum wage and enterprises 
reporting average wage lower than 1.3 the minimum wage 
 




in which average 
current wage lower 
than 1.3 minimum 
wage  
in which average reported 
wage is lower than 1.3 the 
minimum wage  
    number  %   number  % 
State 
sector  3222  82  2.5  428  13.3 
Private 
sector  52667  1669  3.2  41883  79.5 
FDI  3457  77  2.2  1361  39.4 
Total  59346  1828  3.1  43672  73.6 
Source
 
: Author’s calculation based on the Census 
Table 12 
Employees in enterprise with average wage lower than 1.3 minimum wage and 
employees in enterprises reporting average wage lower than 1.3 the minimum 
wage 
 




in which average 
current wage lower 
than 1.3 minimum 
wage  
in which average reported 
wage is lower than 1.3 the 
minimum wage  








80653  4.0  1231175  61.5 
FDI 
1252252 
31792  2.5 
633629 
  50.6 
Total  4852942  156545  3.2  2249821  46.4 
Source
 
: Author’s calculation based on the Census 
These problems of leakage have important financial  implication. The  provision of 
minimum pensions implies transfers of resources from average and high income earners 
to low income earners. Everything being the same, if only the pension formula was used 
to calculate pensions, low income earners would receive lower pensions and the system would have more resources “not used” and for example, a more generous pension 
formula could be applied. At the contrary, the payment of the minimum pension to 
retirees who are not low income earners raises financial concerns. It enlarges the amount 
of resources needed to finance the policy, and at term, it obliges to introduce less 
generous pension formula to “free up” more resources to finance the minimum pension.  
 
6.  Conclusions  
 
This study investigated enterprises’ registration to VSS and employee’s preferences 
regarding social insurance. The results show strong evidence that employees working in 
enterprises that evade (registration or contributions) receive higher net wages  than 
employees of the same industry working in enterprises that do  not evade. The main 
reason for evasion does not seem rooted, therefore, only in enterprises’ willingness to 
obtain higher revenues per worker. These results corroborate the view that in Vietnam 
workers collude with employers to evade social insurance contribution (Dao Quang Vinh, 
2008?).  
 
Employee’s lack of understanding of social insurance is probably one of the causes of 
such behavior. Employee’s low valuation of social insurance is probably another 
important factor. As L. Summers (1989) explains, employees are not willing to work in 
enterprises that pay contribution if the Social Security mandated benefits are worthless to 
them. As Perry observes, in a review of issues related to the informal sector in Latin 
America, this view suggests that high informality results from a blunt societal indictment 
of the quality of the state’s service provision.  
 
What factor currently dominated in Vietnam is difficult to say. It is likely, however, that 
in the absence of reform, population’s dissatisfaction for social insurance services will 
steadily growing in the future. Employee’s reported wages are so low that social 
insurance benefits cannot prevent huge income drop in case of sickness, maternity leave 
or retirement. Evidence that social insurance benefits are useless will be growing as 
employees who have only worked in the private sector will become pensioners.  It could 
happen that, in many cases, pension benefits will replace less than 20% of the employee’s 
pre-retirement average income. Pensioners’ frustration will confirm workers in their 
opinion that the value of social benefits is low and do not deserve paying higher amount 
of contributions.  
 
The irony of the situation is that while the population will show increasing 
disappointment regarding social insurance,  the system financial will be abnormally 
employ large amount of resources to provide minimum pensions. Initially designed to 
provide higher replacement rates to low income earners, this policy will benefit to a much 
larger group of workers that have reported particularly low wages but were paid higher 
amounts. This unbalance between pension benefits and contributions will erode the 
system financial sustainability and increase the public perception that VSS institution is 
rather weak in managing the pension system.  
 Changing enterprises’ and employee’s attitude toward social security is crucial if the 
government desires to build a financially sustainable social security system that achieves 
large coverage rates. Law enforcement’s policies will have probably limited impact if 
other policies are not implemented to increase employees’ awareness of their social rights, 
and the consequences of wage under-reporting.  
 
 
Annex 1  
 
Some enterprises report levels of contributions that appear inconsistent with the number 
employees they report and the legal minimum wage. Legally, the minimum level of 
contribution per worker must be equal to 0.23% of the minimum wage over the year. One 
possibility is that these enterprises hire part-time workers, but in Vietnam such a practice 
is rare. Another possibility is that part of the employees were hired or fired during the 
year. Since only the employees with some long commitments with enterprises are likely 
to be registered to the Vietnam Social Security, the study assumes that these workers who 
have been hired or fired during the year are not registered. Accordingly, the number of 
the employees these enterprises report to the Vietnam Social Security is the number so 
that the average contribution per employee is equal to 23% of the minimum wage in the 
year.  
 
Let’s assume that N is the total number of employees reported by the enterprises, B the 
total amount of wage and C the level of contributions. If w is the minimum wage, the 





* 23 . 0 ≥  
 
Based on the information presented in Table A1, it appears that 39109 enterprises (65.9% 
of the total of the enterprises in the Census) do not verify (1).  
 
Table A1 
Level of the minimum wage in Vietnam in 2005 in thousand VND 
Period  Domestic  FDI region 1  FDI region 2  FDI region 3 
Jan-Sept  290  626  556  487 
Oct-Dec  350  626  556  487 
         
Yearly average  305  626  556  487 
Note: 
Region 1 includes FDI enterprises in the urban districts of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City. Region 2 includes FDI enterprises in the suburban districts of Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City and the urban districts of Haiphong, Halong (Quang Ninh province), Bien 
Hoa(Dong Nai province), Long Khanh, Nhon Trach, Long Thanh, Vinh Cuu and Trang 
Bom (Dong Nai province) Thu Dau Mot, Thuan An, Di An, Ben Cat and Tan Uyen 
(Binh Duong) Vung Tau (Ba Ria - Vung Tau province). Region 3: includes all the other 
areas 
 In these enterprises, the average contribution per worker is lower than 23% of the average 
wage in a year. Accordingly, the number of employees registered by these enterprises to 
the Vietnam Social Security was assumed  the number N* so that the reported amount of 
contribution is equal to 23 % of the minimum wage. 
 
(2)  If   w
N
C








As the figures in Table A2 indicate, the correction reduce the number of employees likely 
registered to the Vietnam Social Security from 4 852 942 to 3 970 591. 
 
 
The figures in Table A2 give a rough estimate of the size of the workers with short-term 
contracts. About 18.2% [=(4852942 - 397059)*100/ 4852942] of the total employees 
could be in that case. 
 
Table A2 
Adjustment of the number of registered employees  
Enterprises that  that contribute to the Vietnam Social Security only 
1. Total number of employees 
      Enterprise sector   4852942 
          + State sector  1598796 
          + Private sector  2001894 
          + FDI   1252252 
2. Total number of  employees after adjustment for inconsistency between 
the level of contributions and the obligation to pay workers at least the 
legal minimum wage  
      Enterprise sector   3970591 
          + State sector  1451039 
          + Private sector  1416344 
          + FDI   1103208 